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II. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT: 
Paragraph (3)(j), Title 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES(and standard of review and supporting 
author it ies). 
A. Whether or not the court erred in ruling as a matter 
of law that there was no genuine issue of causation and that 
the defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment in 
their favor. 
Standard of review is: 
In determining whether the trial court 
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact, the appellate court views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, including 
its conclusion that there are no material fact issues. 
\Neiderhouser Builders and Dev. Corp v. 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193(Utah Ct . App., 1992) 
B. Whether or not the court erred in failing to strike 
the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, defendants' expert, who 
expressed an opinion in support of defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
Standard of review is: 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits should be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
- 7 -
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Whether or not the district court erred in not 
requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's Interrogatories, 
Set Number 3, fully and with candor as required by Rule 33(a), 
URCP. 
Standard of review is: 
"Each interrogatory shall be answered 
separately and fully in writing under oath, unless 
unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for 
objections shall be stated in lieu of an answer." 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"Party must give full and complete answers to 
interrogatory served on him by another party; while he 
does not have duty to search out new information, party 
has duty to provide all information available to him; 
information which is controlled by party is availabe to 
him." 
Trane Co. v. Klutznick, 87 FRD 545 (DC WD Wis) 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. 
A. Statutes: 
1. Title 78-2-2, Par 3(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Title 78-2-2a,(par 3(k), Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Title 78-15-1, Utah Code Annotated. 
B. Rules of Civil Procedure 
1. Utah Rules. 
a. Rule 26, URCP. 
- 8 -
b. Rule 33, URCP. 
c. Rule 56, URCP. 
2. Federal Rules. 
a. Rule 26, FRCP. 
b. Rule 33, FRCP. 
c. Rule 56, FRCP. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
This is a products liability case, Title 28-15-1 UCA, in 
which plaint iff/appellant alleges that she was injured by 
hidden defects in "The Classic" metal steam iron which had 
been manufactured by the defendants and that defendants failed 
to warn of any hidden dangers.(Amended Complaint, Number 1, 
Page 017 of the Record) The case was in the discovery phase 
when the court awarded defendants a summary judgment on the 
merits based largely on the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer and the 
fact that plaint iff/appe1lant had not provided an expert's 
counter affidavit which supported plaintiff's/appellant's 
theory of causation.(Summary Judgment, Addendum 1. 
Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Motion for Summary Judgment, Page 357 
of the Record, Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Memorandum in Support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Addendum 2) 
VI. RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Defendants are related public corporations of 
worldwide scope. One is the subsidiary of the other. They 
- 9 -
manufacture and distribute on a global scale industrial tools 
and home appliances including the metal steam iron bearing the 
trade name "The Classic" which defendants manufactured in 
Brazil and sold in Salt Lake City, Utah, and which 
plaint iff/appe1lant alleges caused her injuries. 
B. Certain sealants, coatings, fluxes, thermal and 
electrical insulations which are essentially chemical 
formulations are manufactured into "The Classic", the 
identities of some of which are still unknown to plaintiff. 
(Such sealants, coatings, etc. have and will, for brevity, be 
referred to by the parties as "chemicals in the iron", 
"chemical products", or simply "chemicals" or variations of 
such terminology.) (Amended Complaint, Number 1, Par 9, Page 
005 of the Record; 2 Par, Page 210 of the Record; Affidavit 
of Elmer T. Davis, Jr., Page 220 of the Record; Letter of 
Roger Christensen, Page 659 of the Record.) 
C. Plaintiff/appe1lant alleges she purchased and used 
"The Classic" metal steam iron in Utah. While cleaning and 
using "The Classic" she breathed fumes (a combination of the 
vapors of all of the chemicals present in the iron when it was 
heated) which emanated from the iron, and her skin was exposed 
to chemicals which were designed and manufactured into the 
iron. In the process of steam ironing, certain of such 
chemicals were transferred to her clothing by the water/steam 
- 10 -
and thence to her skin when she would wear the ironed clothing 
next to her skin. She alleges that it was due to breathing 
the vapors and the contact with the chemicals that she was 
injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff's skin condition was 
diagnosed as contact dermatitis, (Dr. Soteriou Deposition, 
Page 14, Lines 9 & 18, Addendum 7; Dr. Zone Deposition, Page 
26, Lines 5, 6, & 7, Addendum 8) which occurs when the skin 
comes in contact with substances to which the skin reacts. (The 
only cure for contact dermatitis is the avoidance of the 
chemicals to which the skin reacts from exposure.(Dr. Soteriou 
Deposition, Lines 22 thru 24, Page 22, Addendum 7) Plaintiff 
alleges that defendants failed in their duty to manufacture an 
iron without hidden dangers and failed to warn of such 
dangers; further, when specifically asked about the chemicals 
designed into the iron, defendants refused to reveal the 
identities of the chemicals. Plaintiff/Appe1lant must be able 
to show that not only did she react to said chemical but that 
her contact with the chemical came about by transfer of that 
chemical from the defendants' iron to her skin in the way she 
theorizes. (Amended Complaint, Number 1, Paragraphs 12 and 13, 
Page 006 of the Record; Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, 
Lines 12 through 22, Page 47, Addendum 6). 
D. Plaintiff/appe1lant issued her Interrogatories, Set 
Number 3, 25 February 1991, in which she asked in the first 
- 11 -
interrogatory that defendants "list the technical names of all 
of the sealants, coatings, fluxes, electrical and thermal 
insulations" and certain other identified chemicals used in 
"The Classic", along with "the specifications by which each is 
procured." (See Plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3, 
Page 656 of the Record.)) 
E. The reasons for this interrogatory were: The only 
treatment for contact dermatitis is the avoidance of the 
chemicals to which the skin reacts, and proof that a causal 
relationship exists between chemicals emanating from the iron 
and the injury suffered by the plaintiff requires knowledge of 
all of the chemicals implicated. Each chemical must in turn 
be tested and eliminated as a cause or identified as an 
offending chemical. She must be able to show that not only did 
she react to said offending chemical but that her contact with 
the chemical came about by transfer of that chemical from the 
defendants' iron to her body and skin in the way she stated. 
F. "Defendants, in their arguments in this case, from 
time to time, and particularly in the Memorandum in Support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment(Addendum 2), have made much 
of the 'highly technical questions of medicine and chemistry' 
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Page 2, Line 8, first full paragraph and Page 7, 
Line 2, First Paragraph of Argument.), the 'Complex medical 
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and chemical issues'(Defendants Memorandum, Page 11, Line 9 
last paragraph), and the 'complexity of plaintiff's medical 
condition'(Defendants' Memorandum, Page 11, Line 5, last 
paragraph), for the purpose of proving to the court that the 
issues in this case require a high degree of technical and 
scientific thought and analysis, and therefore, the testimony 
of experts." Thus showing agreement with plaintiff that the 
issues in this case require analysis and evaluation based on 
information gained through technical and scientific methods* 
G. Defendants/Appellees did not furnish their answers 
to this set of interrogatories until 15 May 1991, some 45 days 
late, wherein they expressed no objections to plaintiff's 
interrogatories; neither did they, in their answers, account 
for all such chemicals manufactured into their iron. (Cert, of 
Service of Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's/Appellant's 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3, Page 200 of the Record; 
Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Answers thereto, Page 663 of the 
Record. ) 
H. Plaint iff/Appellant, on 12 June 1991, moved the 
court for an order to compel more complete answers to 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3, and specifically asked for an 
accounting of all such chemicals, thereby expressing objection 
to defendants' answers to her Interrogatories, Set Number 3. 
- 13 -
(Plaintiff's Motion, Page 193 of the Record and Supporting 
Memorandum, Page 195 of the Record.) 
I* On 8 November 1991, the hearing was held on 
plaintiff's motion to compel. At the hearing, by way of 
compromise, plaintiff agreed to accept, in lieu of 
specifications, the names of the suppliers of such chemicals, 
but she still expected to obtain the names of the chemicals 
identified in the interrogatory. The judge, in his minute 
entry dated, 8 November 1991, (Page 273 of the Record) 
granted plaintiff's motion to compel, but designated 
defendants to prepare the order. Plaintiff's attorney, in 
telephone conversation with the judge, obtained permission to 
submit a proposed order. Both parties submitted proposed 
orders. Plaintiff objected to defendants' proposed order. 
(Page 274 of the Record) 
J. The court, on 20 November 1991, signed defendants' 
proposed order which granted plaintiff's motion to compel, but 
limited the information defendants were required to furnish 
and thereby gave defendants/appellees license to ignore the 
requirement of Rule 33(a) of both URCP and FRCP that "each 
interrogatory be answered separately and fully in 
writ ing,! . (Page 283 of the Record) 
K. In a letter to the court dated, 21 November 1991, 
- 14 -
(apparently written without knowledge that the court had 
already signed defendants' proposed order) defendants' 
attorney, in an effort to further argue for his proposed 
version of the court's order, furnished some largely 
previously supplied information tending to anticipate his 
response to the order to be signed by the court. In the letter 
he also admitted that he had not furnished the identities of 
all of the chemicals manufactured into the iron. Later he 
argued that this letter should be taken as his compliance with 
the court's order.(Ltr. to the Court from Roger Christensen, 
Page 659 of the Record; Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Memo in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's/Appellee's Motion for Formal 
Compliance with the Court's Order, Page 326 of the Record.) 
L. Plaint iff/appellant, on 14 May 1992, when it had 
become obvious that defendants were not going to respond to 
the court's order, moved the court for an order compelling 
formal compliance with the court's order of 20 November 1991. 
The court, on 6 July 1992, granted plaintiff's motion, but 
then dictated what the defendants' answer should be, thus 
limiting their answers to information which had already been 
made known. (Minute Entry, Page 396 of the Record) By so 
doing, the court again bypassed the requirement of Rule 33(a) 
that interrogatories be answered "fully". By giving license 
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to defendants/appellees to ignore the rule the court denied 
the plaintiff the benefit of discovery by interrogatory. 
M. Plaint iff/Appe1lant had been seen by Dr. Soteriou, 
Dr. Zone, Dr. Lieferman and Dr. Swinyer. Dr. Soteriou was her 
treating physician. All are board certified Dermatologists. 
Defendants/Appellees have cited each of these as experts for 
the purpose of disproving causation and plaintiff/appe1lant 
has consistently objected. (Deposition of Dr. Zone, Line 14, 
Page 8, Addendum 8; Deposition of Dr. Soteriou, Line 20, Page 
20, Addendum 7) While each is an expert in the field of 
dermatology, none has been shown to have personal knowledge of 
the facts necessary for determining causation in this case. 
N. Defendants/Appellees, on 6 August 1992, moved for 
Summary Judgment based largely on the affidavit of Dr. Leonard 
Swinyer, M.D., defendants' alleged expert, and on the the fact 
that plaintiff/appe1 lant had not "proved causation."(Page 357 
of the Record) 
O. Plaint iff/appe1lant, on 25 August 1992, moved the 
court to strike the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer(Page 451 of the 
Record) for the reason that he did not state in his affidavit 
that he had come to his opinion expressed therein by personal 
knowledge of the identities of the chemicals designed and 
manufactured into "The Classic", by personal knowledge of 
plaintiff's specific reaction or lack thereof to such 
- 16 -
chemicals, by personal knowledge that no chemical designed and 
manufactured into the iron could have transferred from the 
iron to the skin of the plaintiff as she alleges happened, 
and/or by personal knowledge that, if certain chemicals from 
the iron had been so transported to plaintiff's skin, they did 
not cause plaintiff's injuries. Although Dr. Swinyer did 
express an opinion that he thought plaintiff's skin condition 
was more likely to have been caused by exposure to 
formaldehyde manufactured into her clothing, he did not 
indicate in his affidavit that he had personal knowledge that 
the clothes plaintiff had actually been wearing were 
manufactured with formaldehyde • The very fact that keeps 
defendants' "experts" from being competent to testify on 
causation, is virtually the same fact that has prevented 
plaintiff from obtaining experts able to testify in support of 
her theory of causation* That fact is that defendants have 
kept hidden from their experts the knowledge of the identities 
of all of the chemicals implicated by plaintiff's allegations. 
P. At the hearing on defendants' motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiff offered to submit evidence to show that an 
arrangement had been made with experts who would test 
plaintiff's theory of causation, but on objection from 
defendants, the court disallowed admission of such evidence* 
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Q. At the hearing on defendants' motion for Sumnary 
Judgment, plaintiff moved the court that such Summary Judgment 
be issued without prejudice to plaintiff. 
R. The court granted Summary Judgment, on the merits, 
in defendants'/appe1 lees' favor on 9 November 1992.(Addendum 
1) 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The court erred in not requiring defendants/appellees 
to answer plaintiff's interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and 
with candor. 
B. The court erred in not striking the affidavit of Dr. 
Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D. 
C. The court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the 
defendants/appellees were entitled to summary judgment in 
their favor. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A* The court erred in not requiring defendants to answer 
plaintiff's interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and with 
candor. 
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Rule 33(a), URCP & FRCP, states: "Each 
interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in 
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event 
the reasons for objections shall be stated in lieu of an 
answer. 
Rule 26(a) "Parties may obtain discovery by • . .; 
written interrogatories; . . •" and Rule 26(a)(1) Parties may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
act ion,• . •" 
"The frequency or extent of use of discovery methods 
set forth in Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if 
it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought; or(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome 
or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, 
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. 
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable 
notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
1. "The purposes of discovery rules are to make 
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating 
unnecessary technicalities, and to remove elements of surprise 
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the 
facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and 
expeditionsly as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 199, 
429 P.2d 39(1967) 
2. "Discovery should be liberally permitted where 
it is used in eliminating non-controversial matters and in 
identifying, narrowing and clarifying the issues on which 
contest may prove to be necessary. State ex rel. Road Comm'n 
v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914(1966) 
3. It is extremely important, both for plaintiff's 
future health, with respect avoidance, and possible 
sensitization, and for the purpose of establishing or 
disproving causation in this case, that the chemicals which 
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were manufactured into defendants' "The Classic" metal steam 
iron be identified. In order for the plaintiff to prove 
causation, she must first know the names of the chemicals 
which could have caused her skin to react. Their identities 
should not be an issue, particularly when 
defendants'/appe1 lees expressed no objections to furnishing 
such information in their answers to plaintiff's/appellant's 
interrogatories. Plaintiff/appe1lant must show that her skin 
reacts to one or more of the identified chemicals, finally, 
she must be able to show that those chemicals to which she 
reacted had indeed migrated from the iron to her skin during 
use of the iron. Defendants' experts, on the other hand, need 
to know the identities of the chemicals manufactured into "The 
Classic", so they can evaluate those chemicals as to how they 
affect plaintiff's skin, so they can evaluate the mechanism by 
which plaintiff alleges the chemicals migrated from the iron 
to her skin, and so they may develop alternate explanations if 
that is necessary. If the court does not require the 
defendants to provide the names of the chemicals manufactured 
into the iron, the plaintiff is forced to determine the 
identities of such chemicals through scientific analysis. To 
cause such analysis to be done to identify samples of unknown 
chemicals is economically impossible for the plaintiff, and 
there is no guarantee that she would succeed in identifying 
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the chemicals if she were able to afford to buy such analysis. 
The logical solution therefore was to obtain the information 
from defendants by use of interrogatories. The cost to 
defendants of furnishing the identities of the chemicals 
manufactured into "The Classic", by comparison is negligible. 
(Cost comparison, Page 448 of the record) Knowledge of the 
identities of such chemicals does not win the case for 
plaint iff/appellant, but merely furnishes a starting point 
from which she may proceed to prove causation as she alleges. 
Not having the names of the chemicals manufactured into the 
iron effectively dooms her case. 
4. Defendants are related corporations doing 
business on an international scale, their corporate 
headquarters are in Maryland, U.S.A.. "The Classic" metal 
steam iron which plaintiff alleges caused her injury was 
manufactured in Brazil. This case is therefore one in which 
defendants are some 2000 miles away from the plaintiff. Their 
manufacturing plant is some 4000 miles in a different 
direction from Salt Lake City, and since Portuguese is the 
language of Brazil, there is a language barrier. 
Defendants'appe1 lees sell their products in Utah and the 
expect to continue to do so indefinitely, so they should be 
expected to furnish whatever information is necessary which is 
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not privileged. They have not claimed privilege for any of the 
information sought by plaintiff. 
5. In the interest of economy of time and expense 
for both defendants and plaintiff, and because of the simple 
straight forward information sought and because the identities 
of the chemicals involved are under the control of the 
defendants and readily available, it would seem that this case 
would be the very kind of case in which use of interrogatories 
would be ideally suited. Use of interrogatories was supposed 
to minimize the problems associated with taking depositions 
across a language barrier and over the great distances 
involved and to conserve the time of those being deposed. 
6. As it has turned out, even on objection by 
plaint i ff/appe 1 lant , the court did not see fit to require 
defendants to give full and complete answers to plaintiff's 
interrogatories, and plaintiff never did learn the identities 
of all of the chemicals used in the iron to which her skin 
could have reacted. Without such information, no scientific 
tests could be performed, and no "expert", plaintiff's or 
defendants', could develop a credible opinion, which confirmed 
or refuted plaintiff's allegation of causation. 
7. The court exceeded its descretion when it 
failed to require defendants to respond "fully" to plaintiff's 
interrogatories in the following respects: 
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a. When defendants answers to plaintiff's 
interrogatories were submitted 45 days late, with incomplete 
answers, and without objection to the interrogatories as 
required by Rule 33(a), the court erred in not requiring full 
and complete answers to such interrogatories when 
plaint iff/appellant objected. 
b. When the court granted plaintiff's motion 
for more complete answers(Minute Entry, 8 November 1991, Page 
273 of the record), the court erred in not requiring its 
order, and therefore the defendants answers, to meet 
plaintiff's objections and to reflect the substance of the 
motion as argued by plaintiff which asked for an accounting of 
all of the chemicals manufactured into the iron which could 
have caused plaintiff's injury. The court erred when it did 
not state in its minute entry its reasons for not requiring 
defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories fully. 
c. When the court granted plaintiff's motion 
for formal compliance with the court's order of 20 November 
1991, the court erred in not requiring answers which met 
plaintiff's objections and were full and complete. The court's 
minute entry of 6 July 1992, at Page 2, line 4, states, "The 
court is of the opinion that the defendant's compliance with 
the Court's November 20, 1991 Order, Page 396 of the Record) 
was in good faith and complete to the extent it could be. The 
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court does not agree with plaintiff's characterization of the 
defendant's discovery as being inacurate or nonverifiable." 
The court went on to state at Line 6 of the second paragraph, 
"Parties are not required to do the legal work for other 
parties nor are they required to seek out information that can 
just as easily be obtained by the party asking for the 
discovery." These comments are the only clues to the thinking 
of the court found in the record, and they were expressed to 
justify imposition of sanctions against plaintiff's attorney, 
but they bear on the question of why the court did not see fit 
to require defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories 
fully. 
d. When the court says, "The court is of the 
opinion that the defendant's compliance with the Court's 
November 20, 1991 Order was in good faith and complete to the 
extent it could be," the court indicates that it used the 
wrong criterion to exclude the information being sought. The 
proper criterion is expressed in Trane Co. v. Klutznick , 87 
FRD 545(DC WD Wis), where it states "Party must give full and 
complete answers to interrogatory served on him by another 
party; while he does not have duty to search out new 
information, party has duty to provide all information 
available to him; information which is controlled by party is 
available to him." The information sought by plaintiff's 
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first interrogatory of Set Number 3, Page 656 of the Record) 
is controlled by defendants. The information sought does not 
require defendants to create new information, all they must do 
is retrieve the already existing information from their files. 
Defendants did not express objection to furnishing the 
information called for by the interrogatory in lieu of 
answering it. Rule 33a, URCP & FRCP, requires that "each 
interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in 
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event 
the reasons for objectionss shall be stated in lieu of an 
answer. However, defendants, since they submitted their 
incomplete answers, have, in their arguments on various 
motions throughout the progress of this case, given excuses 
for not furnishing complete answers and have thereby 
influenced the court. These excuses, however, should carry no 
weight; they are nothing more than tardy objections. 
B. The court erred in not striking the affidavit of 
Dr. Leonard Swinyer, M. D.(Plaint iff's Motion to Strike, 25 
August 2992, Page 451 of the Record) 
Rule 56(e), URCP & FRCP, states: "Supporting 
and opposing affidavits should be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." 
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1. Facts essential to proving causation which are 
at issue: 
a. Plaint iff/Appe1lant alleges that certain 
chemicals were manufactured into defendants' MThe Classic" 
metal steam iron. She demonstrated that are at least 12 sites 
within the iron at which there were components essentially 
chemical in nature. (Affidavit, Page 220 of the Record) She 
sought the identities of such chemicals by way of her 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3. She was denied such information 
when the court failed to require defendants to answer said 
interrogatories fully as required by Rule 33(a), URCP & FRCP. 
(1) An "expert" requires a knowledge of 
all of said chemicals to demonstrate that any one of them is 
capable of causing contact dermatitis in the 
plaint iff/appe1lant, or that none of them are so capable, 
(2) An "expert" requires a knowledge of 
all of said chemicals to demonstrate that any or all of them 
could, or, from defendants' point of view, could not, have, 
migrated from iron to plaintiff's skin as she alleges. 
(3) Finally, even if one or more of said 
chemicals were shown to have so migrated, it must be shown 
that defendant's skin does or does not react to the quantities 
of the chemical which ultimately reach her skin. 
2. Dr. Swinyer is not competent to testify as an 
expert with respect to causation in this case, because his 
affidavit fails to show "affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (Rule 
56(e), URCP & FRCP.) Dr. Swinyer testifies that (to form his 
opinion) he reviewed the medical history and photographs of 
plaintiff/appellant, the records of Dr. Soteriou, Dr. John 
Zone, Dr. Glen K. Lund, the depositions of Drs. Soteriou and 
Zone, Statements and information furnished by 
plaint iff/appellant. (Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, Page 461 of 
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the Record) Note that he does not make any statement 
indicating that he knew identities of the chemical components 
of "The Classic" metal steam iron; certainly he couldn't have 
received such information from any of the sources mentioned 
above. Plaintiff/Appe1lant does not know the identities of 
the chemicals in the iron to this day. Neither Dr. Swinyer nor 
any of his sources have said that defendants\appe 1 lees have 
identified the chemical components manufactured into the iron 
for them for consideration. Dr. Soteriou denied knowledge of 
the iron and didn't think the information important enough to 
record, and said he couldn't (form and opinion about 
causation) without knowing "what is in the iron". (Deposition 
of Dr. Soteriou, Lines 15 & 16, Page 16; Lines 12-22, Page 
19, and Lines 23 & 24, Page 21, Addendum 7) 
3. Dr. Swinyer, at Par 8 of his affidavit, makes 
his most telling pronouncement of his opinion when he says, 
". . . it is my opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, 
(which she has described and as depicted in the photographs 
which she supplied), were not the result of chemicals or 
chemical compounds emitted from the Black & Decker iron which 
she describes in her deposition". The statement, however, 
lacks any credibility, because Dr. Swinyer has not 
affirmatively stated that he knows the identities, or the 
specific characteristics, of the "chemicals or chemical 
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compounds" found in the Black and Decker iron. (Dr. Swinyer 
Affidavit, Addendum 9) 
4. Dr. Swinyer makes his next and last important 
opinion statement at Paragraph 10 in which he states, ". . . 
I believe that her (plaint iff/appellant) pre-existing contact 
eczema and/or contact dermatitis may have been produced by 
formaldehyde resins commonly found in some fabrics used in 
women's clothing." This is a nice observation, but it is 
immaterial to the question of causation in this case. It 
refers to a prior occurrance, and at best he can say only that 
her condition "may" have been so caused. If there is any 
relevance to the present case, (i.e. the skin condition 
allegedly caused by defendants'/appellees' iron) he does not 
explain it, but even if there were relevance, if he is stating 
that all of plaintiff's/appellant's injuries can be attributed 
to "formaldehyde resins commonly found in some fabrics used in 
women's clothing", he has failed to state that he has 
investigated, or made tests or referred to tests designed to 
establish that, the clothing habitually worn by 
plaintiff/appe1lant, the clothing being worn by plaintiff at 
the time of the incident which precipitated this case, or the 
clothing she has worn since the incident while her skin was 
broken out contained formaldehyde. Neither has he made 
allowance for the fact he recognizes in his Paragraph 6. He 
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says her skin cleared up "spontaneously", but if there were 
formaldehyde in her clothing before her skin cleared up, there 
must have been formaldehyde in her clothing after her skin 
cleared up. He doesn't explore why her skin cleared up. She 
had told him her skin cleared after she stopped using the 
iron. Dr. Soteriou testifies that when the topical agent is 
removed, (contact) dermatitis clears up. (Lines 22-24, Page 
22, Addendum 7) 
5. Dr. Swinyer's affidavit does not indicate on its 
face that Dr. Swinyer knew anything about nThe Classic" metal 
steam iron or, for that matter, that he had even seen one. The 
affidavit does not indicate that defendants/appellees informed 
him of the identities of the chemicals which were designed 
into the iron. He does not indicate he knows the 
characteristics of the chemicals in the iron. He doesn't say 
that he conducted tests, or read about tests, which proved 
the chemicals which originated in the iron could not have been 
transported to plaintiff's skin as she alleges, nor does he 
say that even if the chemicals were so transported that they 
did not or could not cause plaintiff's injuries. The best 
that can be said for Dr. Swinyer's affidavit testimony is that 
he has expressed a very unscientific top of the head 
assessment without any personal knowledge bearing on the 
specific facts of this case as they relate to whether or not 
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the chemicals in the iron caused plaintiff's injuries. How can 
he say the chemicals in the iron did not cause plaintiff's 
injuries, if he does not know what chemicals are in the iron? 
He does not say defendants have informed him of the chemicals 
he considered. How can he say that the chemicals did not 
migrate to plaintiff's skin in the way she describes, if he 
does not know which chemicals are involved or if he has never 
performed, or read about, an appropriate experiment which 
demonstrates that point? He sites none. How can he state that 
even if the offending chemical so migrated it would be in such 
minute quantity that plaintiff would not react, unless he had 
personal experience regarding that chemical born of experiment 
or reading? He states in his affidavit that it is his opinion 
that plaintiff's injuries were "more likely to have been 
caused by the formaldehyde in the clothes she was wearing", 
but he does not say that he knows what clothes she was wearing 
at the time, or that he knew that such clothes had a 
formaldehyde component, or even that he knew she reacted 
specifically to formaldehyde." His testimony on all points is 
therefore nothing more than knee jerk conjecture of the type 
all of us make when asked to express an opinion on a subject 
about which we are not familiar, and the defendants/appellees 
want the court to accept Dr. Swinyer's affadavit testimony as 
that of an expert on causation. The Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer 
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fails the test of Rule 56(a) with respect to personal 
knowledge and competency to testify about the facts essential 
to a ruling on causation in this case. His testimony in his 
affidavit is largely immaterial to the essential issues raised 
by defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
6. His affidavit is, therefore, not admissible to 
disprove that plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendants' 
iron. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747(Utah, 1985), and, 
therefore, subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of 
Utah, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 353[2]( 1972). 
7. The affidavit of Dr. Swinyer , then, is no 
better than no expert affadavit at all, and the issue of 
causation cannot be said to be settled, even though 
plaintiff/appe1lant could not produce a supporting affidavit 
from an "expert". 
8. The court erred in not directly ruling on 
plaintiff's motion to strike when it granted defendants' 
motion for Summary Judgment. In effect, of course, plaintiff's 
motion was denied and thus the court erred. 
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C. The court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
there was no genuine issue of causation and that the 
defendants were therefore entitled to a summary judgment in 
their favor on the merits. (Summary Judgment, 14 October 
1992. Page 593 of the Record, Addendum 1; Minute Entry, 2 
October 1992. Page 359 of the Record, Addendum 5). 
In determining whether the trial 
court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, the appellate court views 
the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, including its conclusion that there 
are no material fact issues. 
\Neiderhouser Builders and Dev. Corp v. 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193(Utah App. Ct., 1992) 
1. Plaintiff alleges that one or more of said 
chemicals originating in defendants' iron is the culprit 
chemical. She therefore must determine the identities of such 
chemicals. She has been prevented from obtaining, through her 
interrogatories, the names of said chemicals. Defendants' 
experts have not been told the names of said chemicals either. 
Neither party's experts can proceed without such knowledge. 
This fact keeps the issue of causation unresolved, but the 
names of the chemicals manufactured into the iron are readily 
available to defendants, and they should be required to make 
them available to plaintiff/appe1lant. 
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2. Plaint iff/appe1lant alleges that the culprit 
chemical migrated to her skin. She therefore must demonstrate 
that such migration did or could occur, while the defendants 
must convince a jury that it did not or could not occur. This 
fact keeps the issue of causation unresolved. Once plaintiff 
has the identities of the chemicals, it should be relatively 
easy to demonstrate the validity of her allegations. If the 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate her theory of migration of 
chemicals, she must lose this case. 
3. Finally plaint iff/appe1lant alleges that the 
culprit chemical, after so migrating, caused her injury. She 
must therefore demonstrate that in fact this did happen, while 
defendants must only react to the results of plaintiff's 
demonstration. If plaintiff does not succeed in showing that 
her skin reacted to one or more of the chemicals originating 
from defendants' iron, she must lose this case. 
4. (1) Defendants' motion for Summary 
Judgment raised the issue, "Is there a triable issue of fact 
relative to causation? A genuine issue of fact exists were, 
on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds 
could differ. . . ,f Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P2d 613(Utah 1982). 
In order for non-moving party to oppose successfully a motion 
- 33 -
for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it 
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it 
is only necessary for non-moving party to show facts 
controverting the facts stated in moving party's affidavit. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, v. Janes Construction, Inc., 761 
P.2d 41(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
5. If plaint iff/appellant, at the time of Summary 
Judgment, had not proved causation, it was due to the fact 
that the court did not require defendants to answer her 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3, "fully" as required by Rule 
33(a), URCP & FRCP. 
6. If plaint iff/appe1lant, at the time of Summary 
Judgment, did not have an expert to testify by affidavit that 
it was his opinion that her injuries were caused by chemicals 
manufactured into defendants' iron, it was because, without 
the names of the chemicals designed into the iron, 
plaint if f/appe 1.1 ant was forced to go through some sort of 
chemical analysis to identify samples of said chemicals taken 
from an iron similar to the culprit iron. It soon became 
evident that to finance such analysis was economically not 
feasible, and she was advised that such analysis could not be 
guaranteed to provide the identities of the actual chemicals 
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involved. The whole process had all the earmarks of an 
economic black hole. Without the names of the chemicals 
manufactured into defendants5 iron, no expert could be in a 
position to bring his experience to bear on the problems of 
proof of plaintiff's allegations. This demonstrates that the 
court, in its willingness to accept defendants' expert's 
affidavit to support a Summary Judgment, was operating under 
a double standard. It was perfectly all right for defendants' 
expert to form an opinion about causation which was not 
scientifically based, had no basis in personal knowledge and 
at best reported only on generalities which had only limited 
relevance, if any, to the facts of causation, but the court 
denied to plaintiff/appe1lant the very information her experts 
needed to form a scientifically sound opinion about her theory 
of causation. 
7. Plaintiff/appe1lant did all she could do; she 
offered her own affidavit, born of personal knowledge, which 
explained her situation. (Affidavit, Page 558 of the Record.) 
"(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or deposition to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. Rule 
56(F), URCP, Summary Judgment. 
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8. The fact of the matter is that with respect to 
causation, it cannot be said as a matter of law that there is 
no unresolved issue. Defendants' expert's affidavit and the 
absence of an affidavit by plaintiff's expert does not resolve 
the issue, because the affidavit of defendants/appellees' 
expert should have been stricken and the court should have 
disallowed defendants' motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaint if f/appe 1 lant has not had her day in court on this 
issue, nor an opportunity to prove her theory of causation. 
IX. CONCLUSION: 
A. If the Appellate Court agrees that the 
plaintiff/appe1lant was erroneously deprived of full and 
complete answers to her Interrogatories, Set Number 3, then it 
should agree that the court erred in granting Summary 
Judgment. 
B. If the Appellate Court agrees that the trial court 
erred in failing to strike the Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, then 
it should agree that the trial court erred in granting Summary 
Judgment. 
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C. If the Appellate Court agrees that the issue of 
causation has not been resolved, then it should agree that the 
trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment. 
D. Wherefore, the Appellate Court should find that the 
trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment on the merits, 
reverse such Summary Judgment and return the case to the trial 
court for further discovery with instructions that 
defendants/appellees must furnish plaint iff/appe1lant with 
accurate scientific and/or trade names of all of the chemical 
products used at the sites within the iron identified in the 
Affidavit by Elmer T. Davis, Jr., Page 455 of the record and 
the names and addresses of their manufacturers or suppliers. 
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Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
fCj^t^fe^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
! OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
! vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV 
Judge Moffat 
Defendants7 motion for summary judgment came on for 
i 
( hearing before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat of the above-
! entitled court on October 2, 1992. Roger P. Christensen appeared 
on behalf of defendant and Elmer T. Davis appeared on behalf of 
, plaintiff. 
! The court having considered the oral arguments of 
; counsel; the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties; and 
having further considered the pleadings, depositions and record in 
the case, and being fully advised in the premises, and it appearing 
that defendant's motion for summary judgment is well taken and that 
it should be granted; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary 
Judgment is granted in favor of defendants and against plaintiff in 
this action. ^ 
DATED this l£ day of October, 1992. 
_ J/ 
BY T;~ ~" ~ 
f(icti<}±# H/. 
District/Covvfc^ / Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Summary 
Judgment has been mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following this /3ffi^  day of October, 1992: 
Elmer T. Davis, Jr. 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
\y./*Mfi "fc MAh rj hsu* 
~ -ruiQ IS A TRUE COPY OF AN I CERTIFY THAT-THIS»S^«» ,NTHE THIRD 
DISTRICT
 lg55ir l* STATEOFUTAH' 
DATE: 
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Roger P. Christensen, ==0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendants hereby move the Court for summary judgment in their 
favor and against plaintiff. 
This motion is based upon the ground that the record in 
this case establishes that defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion is also based upon the Affidavit of Dr. 
Leonard J. Swinyer and the memorandum of points and authorities 
filed herewith. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV 
Judge Moffat 
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DATED this day of August, 1992 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN' & POWELL, P.C. 
By. / 
Roger, P. Christensen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of Motion for Summary 
Judgment has been mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following this day of August, 1992: 
Elmer T. Davis, Jr. 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
u 
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Roger P. Christensen, -0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC., ] 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub- ] 
sidiary of Black and Decker ] 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and J 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a ; 
Maryland corporation, J 
Defendants. ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV 
I Judge Moffat 
Defendant Black & Decker hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a rather unusual and somewhat bizarre products 
liability personal injury action, one in which Plaintiff 
essentially claims that chemicals from her Black & Decker Classic 
metal steam iron caused her to have "contact dermatitis11 for 
several years; that she was unable to tolerate any fabric touching 
her skin and was forced to spend at least half of each day naked. 
Plaintiff claims that the defendants Black & Decker, Inc. and Black 
& Decker Corporation, Inc. ("Black & Decker11) designed and marketed 
the allegedly defective iron and are therefore responsible for what 
she perceives to be severe and permanent injuries. Plaintiff's 
alleged injuries specifically include "unsightly skin, sensitivity 
to all fabrics, physical and mental pain and suffering, long term 
medical treatment and monitoring, and a life long fear and 
apprehension induced by her knowledge of the long term consequences 
of such treatment, namely osteoporosis and a shortened life span 
brought about by the use of corticosteriods prescribed for her 
symptoms." Plaintiff's amended complaint, para. 20, p. 9. 
It is the Black & Decker's position that its iron was not 
responsible for Plaintiff's injuries. First, Plaintiff suffered 
identical dermatological problems four years prior to purchasing 
the iron. Additionally, this case is so far-fetched that even 
though Plaintiff has been to multiple doctors, she cannot find one 
who will substantiate her claims. As this case presents highly 
technical questions of medicine and chemistry, Plaintiff must have 
a competent and qualified expert witness to show the causal 
connection between the iron and Plaintiff's alleged injuries. 
Plaintiff has no such expert, while Dr. Swinyer (who did an IME, on 
plaintiff) and Dr. Zone (plaintiff's own doctor), have expressed 
their expert opinions that plaintiffs' skin problems were not 
caused by the iron. Accordingly, Black & Decker is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
FACTS 
1. On December 17, 1987, Plaintiff purchased a Black & 
2 
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Decker Classic metal iron. (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para. 
7.) 
2. Plaintiff alleges that when she cleaned the iron 
prior to using it, it emitted toxic fumes. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
insists that the toxic fumes not only caused her to^have a panic 
attack but also contaminated her skin. (Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, paras. 5, 9a and 9b; Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, 
pp. 25-26.) 
3. Plaintiff also alleges that the iron contained toxic 
chemical residues that were pressed into her clothing, further 
contaminating her skin. (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para. 9c.) 
4. Plaintiff maintains that as a result of her contact 
with the iron, all fabrics that touch her skin cause her to have 
reactions. (Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 65.) 
5. Plaintiff also claims that she is forced to spend at 
least one half of everyday naked because the iron has made it 
impossible for her to wear most clothing. (Deposition of 01 Eve 
Loomis Davis, p. 65.) 
6. Plaintiff claims to have continued to use the iron 
for approximately two and one half years, despite her claimed 
belief that the chemicals from the iron were causing her skin 
condition. (Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 47.) 
7. On February 5, 1988, plaintiff began seeing Dr. Leo 
Sotiriou, a physician who had been practicing as a dermatologist 
for ten years. (Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, pp. 4-6; 
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Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 67.) 
8. Dr. Sotiriou diagnosed contact dermatitis with 
possible atopic eczema and strongly recommended that plaintiff 
undergo patch testing. (Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, pp. 13, 
18-19.) 
9. Dr. Sotiriou understands that plaintiff has not 
followed his recommendation to receive the patch testing, despite 
the fact that at least two other doctors have also recommended 
patch testing. (Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, p. 19) 
10. Dr. Sotiriou has stated that he has not found any 
medical authority to support plaintiff's claims that the Black & 
Decker iron caused her problems. Consequently, Dr. Sotiriou is not 
willing to state that the iron was responsible for her alleged 
injuries. (Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, pp. 19-22.) 
11. On July 10, 1989, Plaintiff went to Dr. Kristin M. 
Leiferman at the Mayo Clinic. Dr. Leiferman recommended that 
Plaintiff enter the hospital for further treatment and continued 
evaluation. Plaintiff did not follow Dr. Leiferman's advice and 
did not return to the Mayo Clinic. (Deposition of Dr. John Joseph 
Zone, exhibit 5, letter from Dr. Kristin M. Leiferman.) 
12. On September 6, 1989, Plaintiff saw Dr. John Joseph 
Zone, the Chief of the Division of Dermatology at the University of 
Utah Medical Center. (Deposition of Dr. John Joseph Zone, pp. 3,4.) 
13. While reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, Dr. 
Zone discovered that Plaintiff had been treated for identical 
4 
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contact dermatitis by Dr. Don Reese at the University of Utah 
Medical Center on October 19, 1983, four years prior to purchasing 
the Black & Decker iron. Dr. Zone also discovered that Dr. Reese 
had scheduled Plaintiff for patch testing on November 9, 1983. 
Plaintiff did not keep that appointment. (Deposition of Dr. John 
Joseph Zone, pp. 11-24 and exhibits 8-9.) 
14. Dr. Zone recommended that Plaintiff receive patch 
testing and scheduled Plaintiff for another appointment on 
September 13, 1989. Plaintiff neither returned for her scheduled 
appointment nor got the recommended patch testing. (Deposition of 
Dr. John Joseph Zone, pp. 26-28.) 
15. When asked if he had an opinion as to whether 
Plaintiff's problems were related to the Black & Decker iron, Dr. 
Zone stated his "tendency was to say that [the iron and the 
injuries] were not related." (Deposition of Dr. John Joseph Zone, 
p. 8.) 
16. On February 5, 1991, Plaintiff was scheduled to see 
Dr. Frances Storrs at Oregon State University Health Sciences in 
Portland, Oregon. Dr. Storrs is a specialist in contact 
dermatitis. The medical evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not 
keep that appointment. (Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, pp. 70-
71.) 
17. On October 2, 1991, Defendant asked the court to 
order Plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination as 
Plaintiff had placed her medical condition in issue and had refused 
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to submit to an independent medical evaluation pursuant to 
Defendant's request. (See "Motion for Medical Examination Pursuant 
to Rule 35" dated October 2, 1991.) 
18. On October 11, 1991, Plaintiff objected to 
Defendant's motion for an independent medical examination. (See 
"Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's Motion for Medical 
Examination Pursuant to Rule 35" dated October 11, 1991.) 
19. On November 8, 1991, the court reviewed the motions 
and memorandum and ordered Plaintiff to submit to an independent 
medical examination. (See "Order" dated November 20, 1991.) 
20. On February 25, 1992, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. 
Leonard J. Swinyer for the court ordered independent medical 
examination. Dr. Swinyer is a board certified dermatologist and is 
considered one of the leading experts in contact dermatitis and 
contact eczema in Salt Lake City. (Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. 
Swinyer, paras. 1-3.) 
21. Dr. Swinyer reviewed Plaintiff's medical records, 
photographs provided by Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff, 
Dr. Zone and Dr. Sotiriou, and a personal medical history written 
by Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, para. 5.) 
22. Dr. Swinyer conducted a thorough examination, and 
determined that Plaintiff's skin was "clear and free of any of the 
skin conditions." Plaintiff told Dr. Swinyer that her skin had 
been clear since June or July of 1991. (Affidavit of Dr. Leonard 
J. Swinyer, paras. 6-7.) 
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23. Based on his professional experience, his 
examination of Plaintiff, and the available medical, personal and 
legal records, Dr. Swinyer expressed the opinion that 
"[Plaintiff's] skin conditions were not the result of chemicals or 
chemical compounds emitted from the Black & Decker iron." 
(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, para. 8.) 
24. Dr. Swinyer also indicated that Plaintiff's "pre-
existing contact eczema and/or pre-existing contact dermatitis may 
have been produced by formaldehyde resin commonly found in some 
fabrics used in women's clothing." (Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. 
Swinyer, para. 10.) 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT MAKE A PRIME FACIE CASE 
AGAINST BLACK & DECKER FOR NEGLIGENCE, 
STRICT LIABILITY OR BREACH OF WARRANTY BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE AN EXPERT WITNESS 
Because this case is rather peculiar and presents highly 
technical questions of medicine and chemistry that are beyond the 
sphere of the ordinary juror, the plaintiff is obligated to provide 
an expert witness who can establish causation. The reasons for 
this requirement are firmly established. First, defendant should 
not be required to respond for damages to compensate a victim where 
there is no known scientific basis for her claims and where those 
who are knowledgeable do not support her contentions. Furthermore, 
courts have instituted this requirement in certain negligence and 
strict liability cases, such as those involving complex medical 
7 
issues, because juries need sound foundations for their decisions. 
Juries cannot be allowed to speculate and must limit their 
consideration to facts and qualified expert testimony. To do 
otherwise would invite juries to base decisions on conjecture, 
sympathy, and passion. Accordingly, the vast majority of courts 
hold that the plaintiff must have competent, qualified expert 
testimony when medical issues are involved. 
Many courts extend the expert requirement to actions 
against any professionals such as engineers, architects, doctors 
and lawyers, holding that the plaintiff is obligated to establish 
the standard of care applicable to that profession and, through 
expert testimony, to establish that the defendant's actions fell 
below that standard of care. See, e.g., Hoopiianina v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(in medical malpractice action, expert medical testimony required 
to establish causation); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1980) (majority of medical malpractice cases require expert 
testimony); Nauman v. Harold K. Beacher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610 
(Utah 1970) (breach of a standard of care for architects requires 
expert testimony). 
Likewise, in strict liability actions, courts have 
consistently required that plaintiff prove the existence of a 
defect, the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product, and the 
causative nexus to plaintiff's injuries by means of expert 
witnesses. See Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991); 
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Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989) ; 
Aarnes v. Merck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1980). 
This rule clearly applies to the instant case. In this 
case, none of Plaintiff's treating physicians have concluded that 
Plaintiff's skin condition is caused by the Black & Decker iron. 
In addition, Plaintiff has not presented any other medical experts 
who will verify her claim that the Black & Decker iron is 
responsible for her alleged injuries. Indeed, this case has been 
pending for twenty-seven months, and although Plaintiff has 
suspected the iron since December 17, 1987, and although she has 
seen four expert dermatologists, she has no medical expert to 
support her case. This alone should be fatal to her case. 
Not only does Plaintiff not have an expert, but Defendant 
can provide an expert who has examined Plaintiff and will 
conclusively testify that her allegations are unfounded. (See 
Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer.) Thus, because Plaintiff has not 
supplied expert testimony to support her claims, she has not made 
a prima facie case against Black & Decker and therefore Black & 
Decker is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the case law is 
clear that plaintiff is obligated to present expert testimony. For 
example, in Fane v. Zimmer, Inc. , 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991), 
plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of an fixation 
device that had been inserted in her hip to aid in healing after a 
fracture. Plaintiff asserted claims of negligent failure to warn 
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and strict liability for design defect. The trial court granted a 
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer stating that 
plaintiff had failed to prove causation because plaintiff had 
presented no expert medical testimony. Id. at 131. In affirming 
the trial court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
M[t]he issue of causation in such a 
complicated medical case, therefore, was one 
beyond the sphere of the ordinary juryman and 
required expert testimony. . . . Absent 
competent medical expert testimony on the 
issue of causation the [plaintiff] could not 
prove the elements of a cause of action based 
in strict products liability or negligence. 
Id. 
Similarly, in Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. 
Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989) , plaintiff brought suit against the 
manufacturer of a breast implant prosthesis, alleging negligence, 
strict liability, and breach of warranty when the implant ruptured 
requiring surgical intervention. The manufacturer moved for, and 
was granted, summary judgment. After ruling that plaintiff had not 
identified the defendant as the manufacturer of the ruptured 
prosthesis, and that she failed to establish the elements of 
failure to warn, the court then directed its attention to the fact 
that plaintiff had not presented any expert testimony to support 
her allegations stating: 
In order to prove her claims of negligence, 
strict liability, and breach of warranty, 
plaintiff must produce evidence that the 
implants were defective and that the defect 
was the proximate cause of her injury. The 
testimony of an expert witness is 
10 
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indispensable in product liability cases when 
the subject of the inference is so 
particularly related to some science or 
profession that it is beyond the ken of the 
average layman. 
Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95 (quoting Virgil v. nKash N/ Karrv" Service 
Corp., 484 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). The Lee 
court further observed: 
The interaction of a breast prothesis with the 
human body raised technical questions 
requiring expert testimony. . . . In the 
absence of expert testimony, the evidence does 
not permit an inference that the leak was 
caused by a defect. It is insufficient to 
rely merely on the occurrence of the rupture 
to show a defect. Proof of a defect in a 
products liability case must rise above 
speculation and recovery cannot be predicated 
on a presumption from the mere happening of an 
accident. 
Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
Expert testimony is likewise needed in the case at hand. 
The interaction between the iron and plaintiff's skin raises 
complex medical and chemical issues. It is highly unreasonable to 
expect the average juror to understand and appreciate the 
complexities of the plaintiff's medical condition without guidance 
from a dermatologist. It is equally unreasonable to expect the 
average juror to make the connection between the iron and the 
plaintiff's alleged injuries without the expertise of a physician 
who can explain causation. In sum, it is impossible for the 
average juror to have any appreciation or understanding of this 
area of medicine without competent explanations from those who so 
11 
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understand. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot ask a jury simply to 
speculate on causation because she alleges that she suffered 
injury. She must present qualified and competent expert testimony 
to support her claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Black & Decker can provide an expert dermatologist who 
will state that the Black & Decker iron was not the cause of 
plaintiff's injuries. In addition, plaintiff's own treating 
physicians are unwilling to connect the plaintiff's injuries to her 
Black and Decker Iron. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has 
provided no experts supporting her position. In view of the fact 
that without an expert plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case 
against Black & Decker, Black and Decker is entitled to summary 
judgment. ^ /A 
DATED this "day of 
CHRISTE^SEtff, JENSE 
/ K o g e r / P . WMci&zerrsen 
A t t o r n e y s / f o r Defendan t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment has been mailed, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following this />- ' day of 
(UJ'/MNTL , 1992: 
j 
Elmer T. Davis, Jr. 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
i 
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Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon 
oath, do hereby testify as follows: 
1. I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology, 
currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2. I am board certified in dermatology and 
dermatopathology. I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and 
-1-
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AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEONARD J. SWINYER, M.D. 
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV 
Judge Moffatt 
board certified in Dermatology since 1973. 
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas 
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of 
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas. 
4. I was retained as a dermatology expert by the 
attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct 
a dermatology analysis and examination with respect to the 
plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis. I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on 
February 25, 1992. 
5. As part of my analysis I have reviewed the 
photographs provided in this case by the plaintiff of the 
dermatological conditions at issue in this case. I also 
interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the 
written medical history she provided. I have also reviewed the 
following medical records and materials: 
a. Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou; 
b. Records of the University of Utah Dermatology 
Clinic, Dr. John Zone; 
c. Records of the University of Utah OB/GYN 
Department; 
d. Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of 
Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund; 
e. The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone. 
6. Based on my own examination, as well as the 
statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was 
-2-
apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25, 
1992) , Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin 
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or 
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided. 
7. Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear 
last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It 
is my understanding that she is not currently taking any 
medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she 
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared. 
8. Based on my training and experience, my examination 
and interview of Mrs. Davis, my review of the photographs, 
depositions and medical records and the other information I have 
been provided, as well as my professional judgment, it is my 
opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described 
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied) , were not 
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the 
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition. 
9. It is apparent from the medical records and 
depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she 
purchased the Black & Decker iron. 
10. Based on the information which has been provided to 
me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly 
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing. 
-3-
DATED this H day of J*pfXiQ 1992. 
CfWlb^' 
'/ 
Leonard J. &yinyer, (fi/D/ 
T^ iYfi'' Subscribed and sworn to before me this U- • day of 
Ap*il7 1992. 
x . 
u^un fr >>AU 
Notary Public^
 y 
Residing at: V^ 0¥ L,CT :: 
My commission expires: \b~ i^tfh " f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE '- <;_GT ' •_.-•.>'? 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J. 
Swinyer, M.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS, OL EVE LOOMIS 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
BLACK AND DECKER 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890907651 CV 
DATE 11/08/91 
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT 
COURT REPORTER NOT PRESENT 
COURT CLERK KBG 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. DAVIS, ELMER THOMAS 
D. ATTY. CHRISTENSEN, ROGER P. 
BASED UPON ARGUEMENTS, THE COURT ORDERS PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER COMPELLING MORE COMPLETE ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES IS 
GRANTED. THE DEFENDANT IS TO SUPPLY THE NAMES OF THE COMPANIES 
THAT SUPPLY THE PRODUCT THAT WAS USED ON THE IRONS. THE COURT 
GRANTS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION. 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DATE: 
rCLERK 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 890907651 CV 
vs. : JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
BLACK AND DECKER, et al., : 
Defendant. : 
The Court having considered the plaintiff's Objection to 
Order Compelling More Complete Answers to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories, the plaintiff's Objection to the Defendant's 
Compliance with the Court's November 20, 1992 Order, the 
defendant's Motions for Sanctions for Discovery Abuse and all 
the memoranda in response and in support of the various motions 
above described and now being fully advised in the premises 
makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
After a thorough review of all of the pending matters as 
DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
above recited the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is 
simply attempting to revisit and reopen matters which the Court 
has already ruled upon and to which objections have been made 
and the Court has ruled on the objections. The Court is of the 
opinion that the defendant's compliance with the Court's 
November 20, 1991 Order was in good faith and complete to the 
extent it could be. The Court does not agree with the 
plaintiff's characterization of the defendant's discovery as 
being inacurate or nonverifiable. The response, informal though 
it may have been, to the last Court's Order by written letter 
rather than formal filing of answers, should have been 
sufficient. However, the Court will order and require that 
those answers as contained in that correspondence be put into 
proper form and filed in response to the request for discovery. 
The history of discovery in this case is exactly as set 
forth by the defendant in it's response to the plaintiff's 
memorandum and does warrant the imposition of sanctions on the 
plaintiff. For some reason the plaintiff has some difficulty in 
understanding the extent and nature to which discovery must be 
responded. Parties are not required to do the legal work for 
other parties nor are they required to seek out information that 
can just as easily be obtained by the party asking for the 
discovery. The Court therefore imposes upon the plaintiff's 
DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel a sanction in the sum of $500.00 to be paid by 
plaintiff's Counsel to Counsel for the defendant representing 
extra cost incurred in the way of attorneys fees and expenses in 
the discovery occasioned by reason of frivilous and clearly 
meritless discovery. The current pending motions filed by 
plaintiff are further evidence of that very fact. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this day of July, £#92 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
STATEOFUTAH/7: ^/^^J^ 
RTCLEI JLERK 
DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
. no-
this I day of July, 1992: 
Elmer T. Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Roger P. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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So I just sat it by the sink and I had a plug there to do 
that phase of it. 
So after it was turned on, and it was heating 
up, then I busied myself just to the right where the 
dishwasher was. And I was unloading the dishwasher. 
Q So this is sitting on the kitchen counter 
heating up while you're working on the dishwasher. 
A Yes. And itfs right there close. In other 
words, my arm could reach to the iron, and this arm, my 
right arm, can reach to the dishwasher. I mean, that was 
the proximity of the iron to me. 
Q When do you recall first noticing a smell coming 
from the iron as it heated up? 
A It was quite soon after I plugged it in. And it 
was very sudden and very intense. And it just sort of all 
at once I kind of was shocked, and it kind of enveloped 
me, and it all just hit at once. I smelled the fumes, I 
had this intense flash of fear and panic, and it was 
really quite scary for me. And my heart, I don't know 
which came first, I think the fear and panic, or it was 
all simultaneous. It was all so suddenly at the one 
moment, that who could say what came first. 
But then my heart beat very erratically, and I 
was very conscious of it being fast and erratically. And 
at the same time the fear and panic. And it just hit me 
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just suddenly when the fumes, when I smelled the fumes. 
And it was very soon after the iron was heated up. 
Q Can you give me some idea of how soon? Are we 
talking a half a minute, several minutes? 
A No, I can't say that. Because if I had had that 
iron longer I would have known how long it takes for it to 
heat up. But at that time, let me think now — I really 
donft know. Because when you're ironing clothes it takes 
a while to get to the complete temperature, but it will 
still be hot halfway through. 
I had it on seven. All right, the fumes 
could start coming out long before it hit that seven 
temperature. So I don't think there's any way I could say 
at what point that the fumes started coming out. Whether 
it had hit that seven temperature or not, or whether it 
was on five or something else. 
Q Now, you obviously could smell these fumes. 
A Obviously. It was very, very scary, it really 
was. It just was scary. 
Q Can you give us any help at all in understanding 
what they smelled like? 
A Now, these chemicals — I've never been around 
working with a lot of chemicals, especially those being 
heated up, so I don't know that I could possibly say. 
Because these chemicals were -h-e-a-fe-sd up, they were coming 
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out in the fumes, and I just don't think I would have had 
any — I can't think of anything in my experience where I 
would have been in a situation like that where I could 
smell them and identify them. 
Q I'm not asking you tell me what they were. 
A No, no, I didn't say that. I said these 
chemicals were being heated, which many times I would 
think, I would think it would anyway, would give chemicals 
a different odor or — I don't know. It's just the fact 
that I don't remember smelling those chemicals before. 
Q What I want — 
A It was very strange for me anyway. 
Q What I'm looking for is was it a damp, musty 
smell, whether it's a — 
A No, musty — 
Q Whether it's an electrical smell. 
A It smelled like weird chemicals. Musty, no. Is 
d: 
jinusty — it didn't smell musty, I can probably say that. 
I just don't think if I were interviewed — I 
just haven't been around chemicals enough, see, to know. 
Q To you it had a chemical type smell to it? 
A Yes. It's a chemical smell, it's not like — 
it didn't have a rotten egg smell, some chemicals do have 
that smell I guess. It just had a weird chemical odor 
that was very noxious. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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seconds. 
Q Did you start ironing about then, or did you 
wait till — 
A I waited the whole time. As I said, I'm a 
stickler for directions. I let it heat up, even though it 
was some hot I let it heat up. 
Q Is there a feature on the iron that tells you 
when it's hit the set temperature? Is there a light or 
something? 
A No. That one doesn't have that feature. I sure 
don't — no, I don't think it does. As I say, it's been 
— I quit using that iron about, I'd have to check that, a 
few months ago. I stopped using that iron after I found 
out that there were sealants inside of the water — of the 
steam chamber. I didn't know that before that. I just 
continued using that iron for that whole two-and-a-half, 
over two years anyway, two-and-a-half years. I forget. 
I can't figure the exact time on that. But after I found 
out — I know I'd used it at least two-and-a-half years. 
After I found out that it had sealants in it and 
I quit using it, evidently I just kept ironing them into 
my clothes. 
Q Okay. 
A I thought the initial exposure, see, at first is 
what did it. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
65 
around — it was sometime in the morning is all I know on 
that, the 17th. I don't even know I can swear to that. 
It was on the day of the 17th, Sometime that day that's 
when I ironed my first pink blouse. 
And then the next day I ironed another, the next 
day another, the next day another. There's four blouses. 
And then on the fifth morning, I had worn all four blouses 
about 40 hours that week, allowing for the time that I had 
to do my writing and my work through the house. So on the 
fifth morning I didn't have any more clean blouses to 
wear. But that morning my skin was very reacting, and I 
couldn't even stand my cotton gown on that I'd worn for 
years, next to my skin. 
And from that day till now no fabric can touch 
my skin without a reaction. It's in varying degrees, 
depends upon what it is, whether it's rayon or linen. 
I've tried everything, I've run the gamut on clothes. I 
have dressmakers make up special clothes. It makes no 
difference unless I'm naked. And I go around the house, 
believe it or not, naked a tremendous amount of the time, 
at least half of every day. The other half I wear a very 
loose kind of a night gown thing that's so full from the 
shoulders that it hardly touches my skin. And that's what 
I wear. And that's what I live in. 
If I go out anywhere, like today, before — like 
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1 Q T cell what? 
2 A T cell lymphoma. It's a cancer that's virtually 
3 always fatal. And she thought that's what I had, because 
4 I'd had it, even at that time I'd had the contact 
5 dermatitis quite a while. And it's one of the things you 
6 worry about with contact dermatitis. 
7 But she did a very, very extensive lab tests and 
8 she took biopsies of the eruptions on my skin, and it all 
9 came back normal, all my blood, everything. No immune 
10 deficiencies, none of that. Everything was absolutely 
11 normal. 
12 And an interesting thing, they put a hospital 
13 gown on me, a cotton hospital gown, and while she was 
14 standing there, you know, talking to me and that whole 
15 bit, I'd been in the gown probably 15 minutes, and while 
16 she was standing there talking to me I started breaking 
17 out from the hospital gown. And so that was kind of a 
18 firsthand information for her. It showed her how I 
19 reacted to fabric. 
20 Q Are you still under her care? 
21 A No. Dr. Sotiriou and I have been looking for a 
22 doctor that's a contact dermatitis specialist, and believe 
23 me, they're difficult to find. We finally found one. 
24 Q And who is that? 
25 A It's a Dr. Frances Storrs, S-T-O-R-R-S, at the 
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1 Oregon State University Health Sciences, Portland, Oregon. 
2 And I have an appointment on 5 February. And they want me 
3 to bring every blouse, she says if it takes two duffle 
4 bags you bring them. Every blouse, every fabric that I 
5 I have reacted to. 
6 Q So you're going there on February 5? 
7 A Five, yes. And I'll be there, they're going — 
8 now, here is the thing, I've been trying for over three 
9 years to get the names of the chemicals in the iron so I 
10 could avoid them in the environment. You can write to the 
11 material companies and clothing companies and find out 
12 what residues remain in the fabric, so I could avoid 
13 contamination. But Black & Decker would not give me that 
14 information until I called up Cigna and talked to Heidi 
15 Ambrosia, I think that was over a year, they had — nobody 
16 had responded or hardly said anything to me for a whole 
17 year. I kept waiting for somebody to give me the name of 
18 the chemicals. 
19 I called her up one day, I had been going all 
20 day stark naked in the house. I was broken out horribly. 
21 I was sitting on the edge of the bed and I was crying, and 
22 I told her that I had to have the name of those chemicals. 
23 Well, she was fairly sympathetic. First person 
24 I'd run into that — in the company nobody else seemed 
25 interested. She said, "All right, I'm going to call the 
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A In pharmacy. 
Q What is the difference? 
A Pharmacology deals directly with the drugs, 
pharmacy is dealing in cells, and so forth, more so than 
just straight pharmacology. 
Q How long have you been practicing as a 
dermatologist? 
A I have been practicing for ten years. 
Q It is my understanding that at some point in time 
you began treating the plaintiff in this case, Mrs. 01 Eve 
Davis; is that true? 
A Yes. 
Q If you could just give me a minute I think I can 
expedite this. 
A Okay. 
Q I assume, Doctor, you have had occasion of having 
your deposition taken before? 
A In medical cases, no. 
Q Have you had it taken in any other context? 
A In other things, yes. 
Q Do you feel like you are at least generally 
familiar with what a deposition is and the procedure? 
A Yes, I do. 
(Exhibit A marked for identification.) 
Q (By Mr. Christensen) Doctor, I have previously 
1 
2 
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Q Yes. And I'm going to number my own copy at the 
same time. 
A Okay. Fourteen pages. 
Q Would you just very briefly go through now each of 
these pages we have numbered 1 through 14 and describe for 
the record what each page is. 
A Okay. Page 1. I saw Mrs. Davis on February 5 of 
8 
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1988, and when I see patients, I usually dictate my notes 
after I have seen the patient. Page 1 deals with the times 
that I have seen the patient, February 5th of 1988 through 
June 24th of 1988, and it also includes any communications 
on the phone. 
Q Okay. 
A Page 2 is the same thing. 
Q All right. 
A And page 3 is the same thing, and my last visit 
with Mrs. Davis was 4-20-90. The next page, page 4, each 
patient that comes in to my office fills out a patient 
information form and it just gives me generally the history 
of where they live, allergies, and so forth, which is page 4 
and 5. 
Q I notice after the typewritten portion of page 5 
there are several handwritten notes. 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell us whether those are your 
6 
chemicals in a steam iron," and also in the back she said 
she had tried Mycostarin and Triamcinolone, which, one is an 
antifungal and one is a cortisone, and she said that they 
made her skin worse, that she is allergic to amoxicillin and 
various other things. Maybe she told me when she was 
speaking to me other things but I didn't write them down, 
Q As far as your objective findings, you noted, and 
I can't say that first one— 
A Eczematized, weeping areas behind the ears, face, 
back and chest, 
Q What does that mean? 
A The skin was very irritated and it was weeping, it 
was like a fluid coming, usually serum. 
Q And this was in areas behind the ears, and her 
face, back and chest? 
A Yes. 
Q And your assessment was contact dermatitis with 
possible atopic eczema? 
A Right. 
Q What is atopic eczema? 
A Atopic eczema is a problem where people, usually 
if you look in the books, it is kind of controversial, but 
it can be hereditary allergies. Many children will have 
atopic eczema and as they get older they will continue to 
have allergies, hay fever, and react to different things. 
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have problems with wool. Some people will say that they can 
have problems with polyester resins, and so forth, although, 
you know, again, in Fisher, which is a book on contact 
dermatitis, he feels that as a rule it is not a dermatology 
hazard, so I guess it is hard to say. You know, I can't say 
yes or no. There are certain things that wool can cause 
problems for some people and I guess certain materials. 
Q There is a book by a doctor named Fisher? 
A Fisher is his name. He is probably the authority 
on contact dermatitis. Alexander Fisher. 
Q And you can get that at the medical library up at 
the "U"? 
A I'm sure you can. 
Q You, apparently, from the note I saw on page 4 of 
Exhibit A, which is the patient information sheet. 
A Yes. 
Q Were told at the first visit that Mrs. Davis felt 
that she had reacted to chemicals in a new steam iron? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall what she told you in that regard? 
A You know, I don't recall. My note doesn't say 
anything about that, although it is in the written sheet by 
the patient, and it is just, "Skin reacted violently to 
chemicals in new steam iron (buffering material inside of 
iron)". And I don't recall anything else other than the 
15 
note tnat I put down. 
Q Would you normally review this information sheet 
as part of the first visit? 
A Yes, I look at it, but I have, you know, 
apparenrly I didn't pay a great significance to that. 
Q Do you recall in the course of your treatment of 
Mrs. Davis from February of 1988 until you last saw her, 
which was in 1990. 
A Yes, April 20th of 1990, I saw her last. 
Q April 20th of 1990? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall that subject coming up? 
A The steam iron? 
Q Yes. 
A You know, no, I don/t recall. I have no where in 
my notes about this steam iron. It doesn't mean that she 
didn't say it to me. I just never put it down if she did. 
It was difficult in a sense. I get a lot of communication 
from Mrs. Davis that she is allergic to a lot of things. 
You know, I wanted her referred off, and she went to the 
Mayo Clinic, she saw doctors at the Mayo Clinic. They 
wanted her to come back and she didn't want to go back. I 
sent her to Dr. Zone, and he wanted her to come, and she 
didn't necessarily want to go back. She was going to go and 
see Dr. Store, who would be a good person to see, because he 
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is pretty well-known for contact dermatitis, and apparently 
I mailed the records up there, and 1 guess that hasn't been 
done yet. 
Q He is a doctor in Portland? 
A In Oregon, yes. But she needed patch testing all j 
i 
the way along and it hasn't really been done yet at this j 
! 
point. ! 
i 
Q I assume that as part of your treatment of her you ' 
made a diagnosis as to her problem? ! 
A In my opinion, sure. 
Q Would that be the assessment that we see? : 
A Yes, that is the assessment, yes, contact • 
dermatitis. 
Q Did your assessment of that problem change during 
the period that you were seeing her? 
A No, I thought she always had a contact dermatitis. : 
i 
i 
I thought possibly an underlying chronic allergy, and atopic j 
i 
eczema in general. Although a letter that I did receive j 
from the Mayo Clinic talked about the possibility of Sezary ! 
i 
t 
syndrome. Many people will have chronic problems like this | 
and then evolve into a lymphoma type problem, which is like j 
a cancer, and they can just sit and smolder like this for a ! 
good long time before this other problem occurs. j 
Q What does that mean? j 
A It is a pre-malignant problem and many times it is i 
a precursor to a person going into cancer, a lymphoma. It 
is mycosis fungoides, and that is a lymphoma, and sometimes 
people have this chronic problem and all of a sudden it will 
involve into this lymphoma problem. It is difficult to 
diagnose. 
Q I assume as part of your work as a dermatologist, 
you try to determine what is causing the problems so that 
you can deal with it; is that a fair assessment or not? 
A It is a fair assessment, in the sense that you can 
see, yes, it is a contact dermatitis, but many times you 
can't specifically pin it onto something without doing 
further tests, like patch tests, and so forth, which I used 
to do but I don't do any more. 
Q The patch test is where you put various agents on 
someone's skin and see which ones they react to? 
A Sure. 
Q And which ones they don't? 
A Sure. And the reason we don't do it as much any 
more is because there are so many agents and they have come 
out with a new patch test kit which is very expensive. If 
you don't do a lot of patch testing, it is not worth doing 
it, so that's why you have people like Dr. Zone, or this Dr. 
Store, who has massive patch testing abilities do this type 
of test for you. 
Q And that is something that has been recommended 
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for Mrs. Davis? 
A Yes, 
Q But she has not yet had it? 
A That is my understanding, yes. 
Q And why is that sort of testing done? 
A It helps to find out if you are reacting to 
something or allergic to something. It can help take away 
the cause of it. I mean if you are allergic to 
preservatives that are found in lotions, you keep away from 
those lotions. You do that to find out what may be causing 
the rash. 
Q Have you, as part of the work that you have done 
with her, formed at least a preliminary opinion as to 
whether or not the Black and Decker iron has caused her 
problems? 
A You know, I can't say that it has or it hasn't. I 
just cannot say. I have never read— I have tried to find 
out if there is any possibility of the Black and Decker 
steam iron causing the problem. I have never read anything 
in my medical journals. I'm not saying that it is not 
possible but I have never seen anything in the medical 
journals that says that that is a possibility. 
Q You have never seen it or been able to find any 
medical authority? 
A Right, I haven't. 
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involves chemicals that are within that iron, and unless 
they know what those chemicals are, they can't make a 
decision that it is not the fault." It is the fact that your 
defendants have not provided the information. Now, our last 
interrogatories asked for the information and that is due on 
the 28th. I notice my letter said the 25th but it is really 
the 28th. 
Q (By Mr. Christensen) You need to understand, 
Doctor, that he periodically will make objections to make a 
record. 
A Okay. 
Q Obviously, we don't have a judge here to rule on 
such things. 
A Right. 
Q So he is making a record. That doesn't mean that 
you don't answer the questions. We will deal with that with 
the Court later if we need to. Do you need— 
A I think I remember the question. 
Q You were starting to answer that while you allow 
for the possibility that the iron played some role, both 
you, and from your discussions with Dr. Zone, are skeptical 
that that is true? 
A You have to ask Dr. Zone on that. I can't say 
without, again, knowing what is in the iron. I'm not even 
sure if I found out if you can do patch testing. I'm sure 
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you can. You know, if it is stuff that is in the iron, I 
guess if it is something like an acid, or something, you can 
put it on somebody's skin and they are obviously going to 
react to it. So I can't tell you without, you know, I can't 
say for sure one way or the other. Anything is possible 
but, you know, I have not read it or heard of it. 
Q In the law, I assume you know, in medicine we 
typically don't try to deal with possibilities but 
probability. If you put it in that realm, do you think the 
iron is the probable cause of her problems? 
A Again, I can't say yes but, you know, I have never 
heard of it happening before. 
Q So your answer to that is it is not probable? 
A I have never— It is not probable in the sense 
that I have never heard of that happening before. 
Q With contact dermatitis? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it the sort of thing that a person comes in 
contact with something, I think you used the term a topical 
agent? 
A Yes. 
Q Normally if you remove the topical agent, does the 
dermatitis clear up or is it a permanent condition? 
A If you remove the topical agent, it will clear up, 
yes, but you can also sometimes get cross sensitization. In 
other words, if you react to one thing— What would be a 
good example? If you have got contact with sulfa and then 
you have a reaction to the sulfa, because it is in the same 
category like penicillin, you can have some cross reaction. 
It is hard to explain. 
Q You used, for example, earlier turpentine. 
A Right. 
Q You put turpentine on somebody's skin, and they 
get a rash? 
A Right. 
Q Normally if you remove the turpentine and you 
don't put it on their skin again, does the rash stay or go 
away? 
A The rash should go away. 
Q As far as the causes of contact dermatitis, other 
than what we have discussed, that is contact with a topical 
agent, are there other causes of that? 
A You can get air pollutants, that's where you have 
hay fever, for instance. You can get a reaction to your 
skin. It is not necessarily a contact but it is like air 
pollens. Sometimes people will get eyelid dermatitis from 
fingernail polish, from mascara, from just pollutants in the 
air-type thing. But many people usually have a history of 
allergies to go along with that, too. 
Q Again, if you remove the pollutanrs, does rhat 
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generally go away? 
A It should, yes. 
Q If you have a situation where you suspect 
something is causing a contact dermatitis and you remove 
that item, but it doesn't go away, is that significant? 
A Yes. You would think that the patient would 
improve. Sometimes you would get a cortisone-type cream to 
help clear it up. If you take the irritant away, I would 
think that it would clear up. 
Q And if it doesn't clear up, would that medically 
suggest to you that that probably wasn't the cause but it is 
probably something else? 
A It might have been the initial cause but, again, I 
don't know if that is going to be the only cause at that 
point, you know, if you take it away. 
Q Is that one way to determine, as a dermatologist, 
you try to identify causes, as you say, well, I think maybe 
you are allergic to "X"? 
A Right. 
Q So we eliminate "X" from your environment, and if 
it goes away you say, "Well, it probably was 'X'n? 
A Yes. 
Q If it doesn't go away, you say, "We probably 
haven't found the problem. We better look for something 
else"? 
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A T r u e . 
0 I s t h a t an a c c e p t e d method i n your f i e l d ? 
A Y e s . 
Q Getting back to Exhibit A. By the way, what kind 
of time frame are working with here, Doctor? 
A We can go to about 2:30. 
Q Getting back to Exhibit A, you next saw the 
patient on February 12, 1988, or is that a telephone call? 
A Telephone message. 
Q Can you tell from looking at that what the reason 
for the telephone conversation was? 
A She called and she said she was having trouble 
sleeping at night. I had her on prednisone, which is an 
oral cortisone, and sometimes people will have trouble 
sleeping when they take oral cortisone. That's why I tell 
them to take it in the morning and maybe they will have less 
of a problem at night sleeping, but it can cause some people 
to have a little difficulty in sleeping. 
Q Okay. And it appears that caffeine was also 
something that was a concern during that phone call? 
A Yes. 
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 I Q Were you able to determine whether her sleeping 
problem was the caffeine or the prednisone? 
A I couldn't say. 
Q The next note on your chart is 2-7-88. Oh, before 
25 
23 
24 
25 
A No. What many people do with hot showers, is the 
fine cutaneous nerves, it will take away the itching for 
them initially, and then when they get out the problem 
starts itching more. It will dry her out more, the water 
will do that. 
Q So that is something that you would recommend 
against? I 
A I wouldn't tell her to do that. 
Q I assume that you see hundreds of people a year in J 
your practice; is that a fair statement? i 
t 
t\ x e s . i 
I 
t 
Q Is this a fairly unusual case or is this a fairly j 
typical case that Mrs. Davis has? 
A We see a lot of people with contact dermatitis in 
our practice and in varying degrees. The most common we see j 
like hands, because people put their hands in irritants, and ; 
that is the main thing that you see, but you can see people 
with contact dermatitis. I 
Q Are there unusual aspects to this case? | 
A Referring to her medical skin problem? j 
o> V — •— ! 
A No. She just has a bad case of contact j 
dermatitis. I mean she is severe. 
Q Okay. j 
A If that is what you mean. 
57 
1 EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. DAVIS: I do have some things. Do you 
3 recall whether or not 01 Eve talked to you about chemicals 
4
 in the iron and determining what those chemicals are before 
5 she takes a patch test? 
6 A She mentioned that it would be good to get what is 
7 in the iron, the chemicals, before she gets the patch test. 
8 That is probably a good idea. 
9 Q What would be the reason for knowing those 
10 chemicals? 
11 A Well, so that they could be patch tested, however 
12 the thing goes. It is depending— I don't know what is in 
13 the iron, the chemicals. If you put something of these 
14 chemicals directly on your skin, they are going to be 
15 abrasive and caustic, I'm sure, but I am not sure he is 
16 going to be able to patch test her for that per se, or if he 
17 does patch test her, I'm sure he is going to have to dilute 
18 i it way down. If you put an acid on a person, they are going 
19 to react to it. I don't know what is in the iron. 
20 Q Is one of the reasons for knowing the chemicals to 
21 do the patch test just to reduce the size of the universe 
22 that you have to test for? 
23 A Yes, that would be very helpful. 
24 Q Do you recall whether or not Mrs. Davis brought to 
25 your attention the fact that she made the decision to stop 
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years of dermatology residency, finishing in 1977 at the 
University of Buffalo, and then in the last six months of 
1977, I was in an immunology fellowship at the University of 
Buffalo, and that finished my formal training, and I have 
been on the faculty since January 1st of 1978. 
Q I assume you are aware that we are here to take 
your deposition because of a lawsuit that Mrs. 01 Eve Davis 
has filed against my client, Black and Decker. 
A Yes. 
Q And I understand at some point in time you treated 
Mrs. Davis. 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me when you first saw her? 
A I saw her on one occasion, October 19, 1983. I'm 
sorry. 1989. 
Q What was the occasion for your seeing her? 
A I'm sorry. I'm wrong on this. I'm looking at 
something different. I saw her on one occasion September 6, 
1989. I'm looking at a different location in the chart. 
Q What was the occasion for your seeing her? 
A She was referred to me for evaluation. Dr. Leo 
Sotiriou referred her to me. 
Q What was your understanding as to what her problem 
was at the time she was referred to you? 
A That she had a pruritus, or itching dermatitis 
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t involving her trunk. 
2 Q I see you are referring to a letter in your file. 
3 A Right. 
4 Q Is that the report that you wrote to Dr. Sotiriou? 
5 A Yes, it is a letter dated September 6, 1989, my 
6 referral letter after having evaluated Mrs. Davis. 
7 Q It appears to me that I only have one page of that 
8 letter. Excuse me. There it is, it is two-sided. 
9 A It is on the back. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to have the reporter 
11 mark that as Exhibit 1 to your deposition. 
12 (Exhibit 1 marked for identification.) 
13 MR. DAVIS: Do you have copies of the rest of her 
14 medical records here? 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe I do. 
16 Q (By Mr. Christensen) Did you form an opinion as 
17 to what her problems were? 
18 A At the time I examined Mrs. Davis, she didn't have 
19 an active eruption on her chest and back. It was a 
20 historical point. What I did was to review her records, 
21 including her biopsies that had been done previously at the 
22 Mayo Clinic, and at that time she showed me some pictures 
23 that had apparently been taken during the point where her 
24 disease was active. On the basis of that information, and 
25 it was my impression that she had a chronic type of eczema, 
whether or not this was related to—I put down here possibly 
contact dermatitis, although I couldn't tell, since I didn't 
actually see her when she was broken out. 
The biopsies done at the Mayo Clinic, which she 
allowed me to see, apparently were suggestive of cutaneous 
T-cell lymphoma, which is a type of cancer of the lymph 
cells in the skin but, however, a definite diagnosis of that 
could not be made, so it was my overall opinion that at the 
time I saw her that she had eczema and no more definitive 
statement could be made. 
Q Now, you indicated that she let you see some 
biopsies? 
A Well, photographs. I guess what I saw was biopsy 
reports. She had two biopsies done which said she had a 
contact dermatitis. I saw biopsy reports. I don't think I 
actually saw biopsy slides, that I recall, anyway. 
Q Was it your comment in your letter, and I'm 
referring now to the second page of the letter. 
A Yes. 
Q "I cannot rule out the possibility that she may 
have cutaneous T-cell lymphoma." 
A Yes. 
Q Was that based on your personal observations or 
what is that based on? 
A That was based on the history and information that 
6 
I was given in the records because when I saw Mrs. Davis she 
wasn't actually broken out with any particular eruptions. 
Q Let me review briefly with you the top of the 
second page of the letter. "She did not have any lesions at 
the time that I saw her." Did she have anything that you 
could look at? 
A The physical exam that I performed and the 
objective information that I accumulated at that time are 
listed in that paragraph. It says that I reviewed the 
pictures, which apparently looked to me to be some 
erythematous papules, and bumps, and on examining her I 
could find no evidence of lymph node enlargement, which is 
adenopathy, that her liver and spleen were, in my estimate, 
normal, and, consequently my physical exam at the time I saw 
her was negative. 
MR. DAVIS: Negative for what? 
THE WITNESS: Negative for the things that I just 
mentioned, for the presence of lymph nodes, for the presence 
of liver enlargement, for the presence of splenic 
enlargement, and for the presence of eruptions on her back 
or chest. 
Q (By Mr. Christensen) Did she have any abnormal 
skin condition when you saw her? 
A Apparently not. I write in my letter that, "She 
did not have any lesions at this time." 
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Q She apparently indicated to you that she felt some 
of the skin problems she had were related to an iron that 
she had ironed some blouses with. Do you recall that? 
A I remember her telling me that, yes. 
Q Do you have an opinion as to whether the problems 
she is describing related to that iron? 
A Well, that was a peculiar history because I had 
never heard of such a thing happening, so my tendency was to 
say that it was not related, although, because I had never 
heard of any similar sequence of events occurring. 
Q So would it be your judgment that her problems are 
probably not related to that iron? 
A That would be my best judgment. 
MR. DAVIS: I object to causation questions, as 
yesterday, as being improper inasmuch as the defendant holds 
the key to the identity of the chemicals in the iron and has 
not made those available yet. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We don't necessarily agree with 
that, but you have made your record. 
Q (By Mr. Christensen) I think you got interrupted 
in the middle of your answer. Were you finished? 
A I don't remember what the question was. 
Q Is it your judgment that her problems are probably 
not related to the iron? 
A Yes, that would be my answer to that. 
o 
O 
1 Q Were you aware that she had been diagnosed by Dr. 
2 Sotiriou as having atopic eczema and contact dermatitis? 
3 A No, I wasn't at the time I saw her. I didn't have 
4 a letter of referral, unless she mentioned to me, I don't 
5 remember it nor do I have any record of it. 
6 Q As of the time that you saw her, what information 
7 did you have other than that we have already discussed? 
8 A The information that I had was a series of letters 
9 as well as the pictures that I mentioned previously, a 
10 series of copies of Xeroxed medical records from the Mayo 
11 Clinic, including laboratory results, a letter from Dr. 
12 Kristin Leiferman. 
13 Q Can you give us the date on that letter? 
14 A Sure. July 13, 1989. I guess I do have letters. 
15 I have a record from—I can't say for sure who this is from. 
16 I have office notes from 2-5-89, 2-12-88, 2-7-88. This one 
17 is signed. 
18 Q Let me do this. Let me just mark those. I believe 
19 I have a copy of your file. Let me hand you this document. 
20 Can you tell me if that is the same one? 
21 A That is the document I am referring to. 
22 (Exhibit 2 marked for identification.) 
23 Q (By Mr. Christensen) I have had that marked as 
24 Exhibit 2. 
25 A I also have a letter from Mrs. Davis to Dr. 
substances are applied to the skin that are irritating the 
skin in a nonspecific way, much like any irritating 
substance being applied to anyone's skin would produce a 
type of irritation. Those are the two types of contact 
dermatitis. 
Q Can you determine, from what information you have 
here, which type Mrs. Davis had? 
A No. 
Q Do you need to do a patch testing to do that? 
A We prefer to do patch testing to try to establish 
specific allergic reactions to substances that could then be 
implicated into the clinical situation and explain the 
disorder. 
Q What causes atopic dermatitis? 
A Atopic dermatitis is believed to be hereditary in 
nature and is a condition in which the skin is inherently 
irritable. The exact mechanism by which the lesion occurs 
is uncertain, but it is known to be associated with asthma, 
hay fever, and on occasion, although not necessarily, may be 
accentuated by dryness, and by irritating substances applied 
to the skin. 
Q After reviewing the 1983 new patient evaluation 
sheet, and the other documents we have looked at, does it 
appear to you that the problems Mrs. Davis was complaining 
of in September of 1989 when you saw her were essentially 
24 
1 substances are applied to the skin that are irritating the 
2 skin in a nonspecific way, much like any irritating 
3 substance being applied to anyone's skin would produce a 
4 type of irritation. Those are the two types of contact 
5 dermatitis. 
6 Q Can you determine, from what information you have 
7 here, which type Mrs. Davis had? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Do you need to do a patch testing to do that? 
10 A We prefer to do patch testing to try to establish 
11 specific allergic reactions to substances that could then be 
12 implicated into the clinical situation and explain the 
13 disorder. 
14 Q What causes atopic dermatitis? 
15 A Atopic dermatitis is believed to be hereditary in 
16 nature and is a condition in which the skin is inherently 
17 irritable. The exact mechanism by which the lesion occurs 
18 is uncertain, but it is known to be associated with asthma, 
19 hay fever, and on occasion, although not necessarily, may be 
20 accentuated by dryness, and by irritating substances applied 
2^ to the skin. 
22 I Q After reviewing the 1983 new patient evaluation 
23 sheet, and the other documents we have looked at, does it 
24 appear to you that the problems Mrs. Davis was complaining 
25 of in September of 1989 when you saw her were essentially 
24 
the same as she had as far back as 1983? 
A It is impossible for me to say that because I 
didn't see her in 1983, but the symptoms, certainly the 
location of the complaint was similar, and it was the type 
of eczema or dermatitis, and, by the way, the term eczema 
and dermatitis are used synonymously in dermatology, so, 
certainly the distribution and the history were in similar 
areas, yes. 
Q Do you have a judgment as to whether the problem 
had become worse or stayed about the same? 
A Well, when I examined her on September 6th, 1989, 
I note that she had no lesions, that she did not have any 
lesions at that time, and apparently when she was examined 
by Dr. Reese in 1983, she did have lesions, so it would have 
appeared that it got better, just based on the information 
on those two visits to the University of Utah Medical 
Center. 
Q You stated earlier that dermatitis and eczema are 
synonymous in dermatology. 
A They are used synonymously by clinicians and 
literally they aren't totally synonymous but that is the way 
they are used. 
Q So is atopic eczema— 
A An atopic dermatitis would refer to the same 
condition. 
25 
1 Q What about atopic eczema and contact dermatitis; 
2 would they be the same? 
3 A No. 
4 Q What is the difference between those two? 
5 A Contact dermatitis implies that a topical or 
6 externally applied agent is believed to be responsible for 
7 I the disorder and atopic dermatitis is believed that patients 
on the genetic or hereditary basis have an inherent tendency 
9 I to have their skin become irritated. Now, certain people 
10 with atopic dermatitis can develop problems from contact, 
11 but atopic, the term atopic dermatitis as it is used by most 
12 physicians refers to an inherent genetic or hereditary 
13 tendency to develop dermatitis. 
14 Q I'm going to show you a document which I have in a 
15 set and I'm not sure if that is from your file. If it is, 
16 we will mark it, if not I won't. 
17 A Yes, I have this in my file. It is part of the 
18 information received as copies from the Mayo Clinic. It is 
19 a hospital medical admission form. 
20 (Exhibit 10 marked for identification.) 
21 Q (By Mr. Christensen) In your letter of September 
22 6, 198 9 — By the way, is that the only document in your 
23 file that you generated? 
24 A Yes. I apparently examined the patient on 
25 September 6th, 1989, and when I see consultations from other 
26 
1 dermatologists, and Dr. Sotiriou is another dermatologist, I 
2 always dictate them a letter at that time of my findings, 
3 and this letter or note from that day, I use the letter and 
4 the note as the same, and then I gave her an appointment to 
5 return on September 13, 1989, for which she did not report. 
6 Q You didn't keep handwritten notes? 
7 A No. 
8 Q But the September 6th letter served that dual 
9 purpose? 
10 A Right. 
it Q Your letter states, "This woman has never been 
12 patch tested and I would like the opportunity to patch test 
13 her at some point." 
14 A She is on prednisone continually. Prednisone 
15 negates the patch test, so if one were to have a positive 
16 patch test, it would be negative when the patient is taking 
17 prednisone. 
18 Q So normally you need to get them off the 
19 prednisone? 
20 A You need to get the patient off prednisone, and 
2' then after three to four weeks patch test them. 
22 Q Was that your plan, was to get her off the 
23 I prednisone and then do the patch test? 
24 A I say, "Hopefully I will be able to taper her 
25 prednisone in the future and then patch test her." That was 
27 
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CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY- OF SALT LAKE : 
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon 
oath, do hereby testify as follows: 
1. I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology, 
currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2. I am board certified in dermatology and 
dermatopathology. I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and 
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board certified in Dermatology since 1973. 
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas 
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of 
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas. 
4. I was retained as a dermatology expert by the 
attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct 
a dermatology analysis and examination with respect to the 
plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis. I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on 
February 25, 1992. 
5. As part of my analysis I have reviewed the 
photographs provided in this case by the plaintiff of the 
dermatological conditions at issue in this case. I also 
interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the 
written medical history she provided. I have also reviewed the 
following medical records and materials: 
a. Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou; 
b. Records of the University of Utah Dermatology 
Clinic, Dr. John Zone; 
c. Records of the University of Utah OB/GYN 
Department; 
d. Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of 
Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund; 
e. The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone. 
6. Based on my own examination, as well as the 
statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was 
-2-
apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25, 
1992), Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin 
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or 
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided. 
7. Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear 
last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It 
is my understanding that she is not currently taking any 
medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she 
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared. 
8. Based on my training and experience, my examination 
and interview of Mrs. Davis, my review of the photographs, 
depositions and medical records and the other information I have 
been provided, as well as *my professional judgment, it is my 
opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described 
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not 
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the 
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition. 
9. It is apparent from the medical records and 
depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she 
purchased the Black & Decker iron. 
10. Based on the information which has been provided to 
me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly 
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing. 
-3-
I)ATED t h i s 1 day ot Jjpf%\) 1992. 
•^QJJ.Ji^ hv>. 
Leoriard J. styinyer, jfyD/ 
w
'lY'i.^  Subscribed and sworn to before me this A- day of 
Ap*ilY 1992-
Notary Public^.
 r 
Residing at: si {[ (^CT 
My commission expires: IL^^j^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J hereby certify that on the day of April, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J. 
Swinyer, M>D- was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
-4-
Tab 10 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.,827 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)521-9529 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC. (a 
Maryland Corporation authorized 
to do business in the State of Utah, 
and a subsidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc.) 
and 
BLACK AND DECKER CORPORATION, INC. 
(A Maryland corporation.) 
Defendants 
Comes now the plaintiff, by and through her attorney, and 
moves the Court to strike the affidavit given by Dr. Leonard J. 
Swinyer, M.D., dated 4 May 1992, and offered as a supporting ex-
hibit to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 6 August 
1992, against plaintiff on the issue of causation. 
This motion is made on the ground that although Dr. Swinyer is 
a board certified dermatologist and is competent to testify with 
respect to certain aspects of this case which lie within his expe-
rience and training in dermatology, he is not competent to testify 
PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DR. SWINYER 
DATED, 4 MAY 1992. 
Civil Number 
89-0907651CV 
Judge R. H. Moffat 
4 ~> * 
as to causation in this case for the following reasons. 
1. The essence of causation in this case involves certain 
chemicals which were indisputably manufactured into the defendants' 
"The Classic" metal steam iron and the mechanism by which such 
chemicals were transported to plaintiff's skin to cause her inju-
ries. (See Exhibit 1, Affidavit by Elmer T. Davis, Dated 12 June 
1991, which identifies the location of some 12 sites within the 
iron at which defendants have used largely unidentified sealants, 
coatings, fluxes, thermal and electrical insulation. (See Amended 
Complaint, Number 1, Page 4, Paragraphs 9b,c, and d.) 
2. Dr. Swinyer's affidavit does not indicate on its face 
that Dr. Swinyer has ever seen "The Classic" metal steam iron or a 
picture of one, that he has ever seen inside of the iron or viewed 
pictures of the interior of the iron that show the locations of 
said chemicals, that he has seen the chemical products involved as 
they have been used in the iron, that he knows the identities of 
the chemicals making up such products, that he knows the character-
istics of the chemicals of such products, that he knows that in 
fact these chemicals were not transferred from the iron to 
plaintiff's skin, that he knows that the chemicals in defendants' 
iron, if they were transported to plaintiff's skin, did not cause 
plaintiff's injuries. (See Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, 
Paragraphs 5a through e and Paragraph 8.) 
3. In short, Dr. Swinyer's opinion as expressed in Para-
/' r"/i 
graphs 5a through e and Paragraph 8 of his affidavit is based on 
hearsay, which is not germane to the iron, the chemicals it 
contains or to the issue of causation, and the affidavit does not 
show on its face that it is "made on personal knowledge" as re-
quired by Rule 56e, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Dr. Swinyer, 
therefore, is not competent, based on his affidavit, to testify as 
an expert on the issue of causation in this case. His affidavit is 
not admissible as proof that plaintiff's injuries were not caused 
by defendants' iron. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747(Utah , 
1985) and it is, therefore, subject to a motion to strike. Howick 
v. Bank of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 353[2 ] (1972). 
WHEREFORE the Court should strike the affidavit of Dr. Leonard 
J. Swinyer, M.D., dated 4 May 1992, when used for the purpose of 
supporting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Dated and submitted this the 25th day of August, 1992. 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
EXHIBIT 1 
to 
PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF DR. SWINYER, DATED 4 MAY 1992 
Civil Number 89-090765ICV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
ATTACHMENT #1, to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Plaintifffs Motion 
For Order Compelling More Complete Answers to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories,(Set) Number 3. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE: 
I, Elmer T. Davis, Jr., at the request of, and on behalf of, the 
plaintiff did, during the month of September 1990, disassemble one new "The 
Classic" metal steam iron of "Lot" Number 004. Having done so, the 
following observations are noted. 
1. Without special tools, one must destroy the water fill funnel 
in order to disassemble the iron. Therefore, once having disassembled the 
iron, it is impossible to reassemble it to its original condition, without 
having a replacement water fill funnel. 
2. There is a white sealant used at several points on the water 
reservoir. 
3. There is an ink-like coating used on the water reservoir and 
on the thermostatic control assembly. 
4. There is a white sealant, similar in appearance to the one 
mentioned in 2. above, used, not as a sealant for liquid but instead as an 
electrical insulation, at several points on the thermostatic control 
assembly. 
i CERTFYTHATTHIS IS ATRUE COFY C - A 
0HK3INAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIF.-J 
DISTRICT QOURT, SALT LAKE ,CCU:;TY 
.
 f - 1SIATEXJF fr&?> I ^ C ? 
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5. There is a white sealant, similar in appearance to the one 
mentioned in 2. above, used as a sealant for steam and liquid at the 
interface of the steam chamber with the ceramic nozzle which controls the 
flow of water to the steam chamber. This material comes in contact with the 
steam. 
6. There is a rubber-like washer at the interface of the water 
reservoir and the ceramic nozzle and a second rubber-like washer at the 
interface of the ceramic nozzle and the steam chamber. Both washers are 
subjected to the heat of the iron when in use and would contribute to the 
fumes. 
7. There is a white(gray) paste-like sealant at the common 
surfaces of the two castings which comprise the steam chamber. This 
material comes in contact with the steam. 
8. There appears to be a white coating on the unpolished surface 
of the soleplate casting. This material comes in contact with the steam and 
could erode or otherwise be picked up by the steam and deposited on ironed 
clothing. 
9. The water reservoir, is stamped out of a brass-like material, 
and a lubricant could have been used to facilitate the stamping process. If 
so, such lubricant could constitute a contaminating residue which would 
contribute to the fumes breathed by plaintiff and/or be picked up by the 
water and ultimately transferred to plaintiff's ironed clothes. 
10. The inner surface of the water reservoir could have been 
coated. If so, such coating comes in contact with the water and could 
n£ .
 2 . C- /—.. /^  
thereby be transmitted to the steam chamber and thence to the plaintiff's 
ironed clothes. 
11. At at least two electrical connection points a flux was used 
to make the soldered or brazed connection. Such flux was readily visible 
and had not been cleaned from the iron inspected, so constitutes a 
contaminating residue which would contribute to the fumes emitted by the 
iron when hot. 
12. The power cord has a rubberlike insulation which is subjected 
to heat when the iron is in use and could therefore contribute to the fumes 
emitted when iron is hot. 
13. There is an insulation material surrounding the heating 
element which prevents shorting to the sole plate casting. This material 
could contribute to the fumes emitted when the iron is hot. 
14. All of the chemicals making up the compounds identified above 
and any chemicals of compounds not here mentioned and used in aid of 
manufacture, such as cleaners, lubricants and solvents which leave a 
residue on parts incorporated into the iron, could contribute to the fumes 
breathed by plaintiff when she performed the "Before First Use" cleaning 
procedure, and some could contaminate the steam during use of the iron for 
a long period of time. 
Executed on this the 12th day of June, 1991, at Salt Lake City, State 
of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE: 
On the 12ff~ day of June, 1991, personally appeared before me, Elmer 
Thomas Davis, Jr., who executed the foregoing declaration in my presence. 
My commission expires: 
3 ' 
~^fs.*~~ J^C^^ 
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EXHIBIT 2 
to 
PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDVIT OF DR. SWINYER, DATED 4 MAY 1992 
Civil Number 89-0907651CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
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Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Black and Decker 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.j^ INC., 
(a Maryland corporation 
authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah, and a sub-
sidiary of Black and Decker 
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK *and 
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a 
Maryland corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon 
oath, do hereby testify as follows: 
1. I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology, 
currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2. I am board certified in dermatology and 
dermatopathology. I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and 
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board certified in Dermatology since 1973. 
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas 
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of 
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas. 
4. I was retained as a dermatology expert by the 
attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct 
a dermatology analysis and examination with respect to the 
plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis. I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on 
February 25, 1992. 
5. As part of my analysis I have reviewed the 
photographs provided in this case by the plaintiff of the 
dermatological conditions at issue in this case. I also 
interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the 
written medical history she provided. I have also reviewed the 
following medical records and materials: 
a. Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou; 
b. Records of the University of Utah Dermatology 
Clinic, Dr. John Zone; 
c. Records of the University of Utah OB/GYN 
Department; 
d. Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of 
Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund; 
e. The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone. 
6. Based on my own examination, as well as the 
statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was 
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apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25, 
1992), Mrs, Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin 
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or 
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided. 
7. Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear 
last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It 
is my understanding that she is not currently taking any 
medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she 
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared. 
8. Based on my training and experience, my examination 
and interview of Mrs. Davis, my review of the photographs, 
depositions and medical records and the other information I have 
been provided, as well as my professional judgment, it is my 
opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described 
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not 
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the 
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition. 
9. It is apparent from the medical records and 
depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she 
purchased the Black & Decker iron. 
10. Based on the information which has been provided to 
me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact 
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly 
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing. 
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r 
H day of>pfTTJ DATED this /   Apl ll 1992. 
Leonard J. Syinyer, fyD/ 
jf\ 
~
;iY«'£'- Subscribed and sworn to before me this *— day of 
April/ 1992. 
/: «^A /~V > 7 
Notary Public^. , 
Residing at: ^('. £v7~ 
My commission expires: /£ /~^2. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J. 
Swinyer, tt.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1181 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, dated 4 May 1992, has been 
mailed, postage paid, addressed to the following, this day of 
August, 1992: 
Roger P. Christensen, Esquire 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
j.:fcu' 
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I certify that I have this, the 31st day of August, 1993, 
delivered two copies of Appellant's Brief on Appeal of a 
Summary Judgment, to defendants by hand delivery to the office 
of: 
Roger P. Chistensen, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C 
Atty For Defendants/Appellants 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8>H0 
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